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I. INTRODUCTION
This Special Project Note on indemnification and the suc-
ceeding Special Project Note on insurance are intended to offer
practical advice to practitioners with corporate clients. All fifty
states have passed indemnification statutes1 that establish the
*This Special Project Note is cited as "Indemnification (Special Project)" throughout
the Special Project.
1. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-21 (1980); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.010 (1985); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10-005 (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309 (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West
Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.5 (1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320a (West
Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983) (amended 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.014
(West 1977 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-156 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 416-35
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-5 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.75 (Smith-Hurd 1985);
IND. CODE ANN. § § 23-1-37-1 to 23-1-37-15 (BURNS SUPP. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.4A
(West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305 (Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.026
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. ] N]12.83 (WEST 1969 & Supp. 1986);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 719 (1981); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418 (1985);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.156-
1 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.521 (West 1985); MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-7(o)
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355 (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-414 (1985);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (1983); NEy. REV. STAT. § 78.751 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293-A.5 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5 (West Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 53-11-4.1 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § § 721-725 (McKinney Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § § 55-19 to 55-21 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-91 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.13(e) (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1031 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 57.255, 57.260 (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1410 (Purdon Supp. 1986); R. GEN. LAWS
§ 7-1.1-4.1 (Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-180 (Law. Co-op 1977 & Supp. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § § 47-2-58.1 to 47-2-58.6 (Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § § 48-8-501
to 48-8-509 (Supp. 1986) (effective Oct. 1, 1987); Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1
(Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-4(o) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1852(15)
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scope and terms under which a corporation may, and in some cases
must, indemnify its directors and officers. Legal counsel should
test the scope of a particular indemnification statute by determin-
ing what standards must be met, what procedures must be fol-
lowed, and what expenses may be indemnified under the relevant
state statute. If a particular indemnification statute is not limited
to the alternatives specified therein, counsel should determine
what additional indemnity is available.
To illustrate the analysis necessary to address these issues,
this Special Project Note focuses on four representative indemnifi-
cation statutes-the Delaware Corporation Act,2 the California
Corporation Act,3 the New York Corporation Act,4 and the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act (Revised Model Act or Revised
MBCA) 5-with an emphasis on the recent amendments to the Del-
aware and New York statutes.6 Part II of this Special Project Note
examines statutory provisions that make indemnification
mandatory. Part III analyzes provisions that authorize permissive
indemnification. Finally, Part IV discusses additional methods of
providing indemnification protection for corporate directors and
officers, such as through charter amendments, by-law provisions, or
individual contracts.
II. MANDATORY INDEMNIFICATION
Indemnification statutes typically contain two distinct parts, a
mandatory part and a permissive part. The mandatory part creates
an enforceable right, requiring the corporation to indemnify its di-
rectors and officers upon satisfaction of certain statutory prerequi-
sites. In contrast, the permissive part grants the corporation an op-
tion to indemnify its directors and officers if an appropriate body,
such as the board's disinterested directors, determines that the re-
(1984); VA. CODE ANN. § § 13.1-696 to 13.1-704 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.025
(Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.05 (West Supp. 1986);
Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-105.1 (Supp. 1986).
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983) (amended 1986) [hereinafter DEL. CODE].
3. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (West Supp. 1987) [hereinafter CAL. CODE].
4. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 721-725 (McKinney Supp. 1987) [hereinafter N.Y. LAW].
5. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 8.50-8.56 (1985) [hereinafter REVISED
MBCA or REVISED MODEL AcT].
6. Most states have adopted, in whole or in part, legislation similar to either Dela-
ware's statute or the Model Business Corporation Act (Model Act or MBCA), which was
promulgated in 1980. The Model Act's indemnification section is virtually identical to that
of the Revised Model Act. Comparing these statutes to those of California and New York
highlights the most salient features of indemnification statutes in general.
[Vol. 40:737738
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quired statutory standard of conduct has been met."
The standards for mandatory indemnification vary among the
four representative statutes. The mandatory part of Delaware's in-
demnification statute requires a corporation to indemnify its direc-
tors and officers for "any expenses (including attorneys' fees) actu-
ally and reasonably incurred" in defending a lawsuit, "to the
extent of" the director's or officer's success "on the merits or other-
wise." 8 Mandatory indemnification under the Delaware statute,
therefore, requires a showing that the director or officer was suc-
cessful on the merits or otherwise,9 not that the director or officer
met the standard of conduct required for permissive indemnifica-
tion.10 The mandatory part of California's indemnification statute
requires indemnification "to the extent" that a director or officer
7. See Pillai & Tractenberg, Corporate Indemnification of Directors and Officers:
Time for a Reappraisal, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 101, 111 (1981) (noting that unlike the
mandatory part, which gives a director or officer the right to indemnification, the permissive
part allows the corporation to choose whether to indemnify a director or officer).
8. DEL. CODE § 145(c) (providing that "[tjo the extent that a director, officer, em-
ployee or agent of a corporation has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of
any action, suit or proceeding. . . he shall be indemnified against expenses (including attor-
neys' fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection therewith").
Delaware grants "management the broadest possible discretion, subject only to the re-
quirement that the expenses have been 'actually and reasonably incurred,'" to define the
types and amounts of indemnifiable expenses. J. BISHOP, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 6.03[3] (rev. 1985). Delaware's standard
for reasonable expenses includes even astronomical counsel fees. The Delaware Superior
Court recently upheld attorneys' fees of $500,000, which averaged $190 per hour for the time
of each partner and associate. See Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d
138, 143-44 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
Statutes with a "success on the merits or otherwise" standard include: ALA. CODE § 10-
2A-21(c) (1980); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.10(c) (1985); ARIz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 10-005(c) (Supp.
1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309(C) (1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.014(3) (West 1977); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-156(c) (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 416-35(d) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-5(c)
(1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.75(c) (Smith-Hurd 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305 (c)
(Supp. 1986); LA. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 12.83(B) (West 1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A,
§ 719(2) (1981); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-418(d) (1985); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.355(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2004(15)(c) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 78.751(3) (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:5(III) (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:3-5(4) (West Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(e)(3) (Anderson 1985);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1031 (C) (West 1986); OR. REv. STAT. § 57.255(3) (1984); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1410(C) (Purdon Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-58.3 (Supp.
1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-4(o)(3) (1953); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9(c) (1982); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180.05(3) (West Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-105.1(b) (Supp. 1986).
9. See Green v. Westcap Corp., 492 A.2d 260 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that an
officer who had been acquitted of criminal charges was entitled to mandatory indemnifica-
tion for his legal expenses incurred in defending those charges despite pending civil litiga-
tion against the officer concerning the same transactions).
10. See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of conduct
required for permissive indemnification).
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"has been successful on the merits" in defense of an action.1 Thus,
the California statute deletes the "or otherwise" phrase that is
used in Delaware's statute. In contrast, the Revised Model Act re-
quires that a director or officer be "wholly successful, on the merits
or otherwise," to be indemnified by the corporation. 2 Prior to a
recent amendment, New York also employed the "wholly success-
ful" standard; 13 New York now has a "successful on the merits or
otherwise" standard.1
4
The mandatory indemnification standards discussed above
differ in two important ways. First, a statute may or may not allow
partial mandatory indemnification if a defense has been only par-
tially successful.15 Under each statute, a "successful" defense is a
prerequisite to mandatory indemnification. 6 By using the term
"wholly successful," the Revised Model Act does not require in-
demnification for a partial success.' 7 Although New York deleted
the word "wholly" in its amended indemnification provision, the
11. CAL. CODE § 317(d) (providing that "[t]o the extent that an agent of a corporation
has been successful on the merits in defense of any proceeding.., the agent shall be indem-
nified against expenses actually and reasonably incurred by the agent in connection
therewith").
12. REVISED MBCA § 8.52 (providing that "[a] corporation shall indemnify a director
who was wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of any proceeding to
which he was a party because he is or was a director of the corporation").
Statutes with a "wholly successful on the merits or otherwise" standard include: COLO.
REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.5(3) (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-9 (Burns Supp. 1986); IowA CODE
ANN. § 496A.4A(4)(a) (West Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.026(4)(a) (Michie!
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-414(4)(1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-
4.1(d) (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4.1(d) (Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-
58.2 (1983 & Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-8-503 (Supp. 1986); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT.
ANN. art. 2.02-1(h) (Vernon Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.025(5) (Supp.
1986).
13. N.Y. BusiNEss CORP. LAW § 724(a) (McKinney 1986) [hereinafter FORMER N.Y.
LAW] (stating that "[a] person who has been wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise,"
must be indemnified).
14. N.Y. LAW § 723(a) (providing that "[a] person who has been successful, on the
merits or otherwise .... shall be entitled to indemnification").
15. For an example of partial success and the right to only limited indemnification, see
Green v. Westcap, 492 A.2d 260 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985).
16. See Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Officers and
Directors, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993, 2003 (1978).
17. REVISED MBCA § 8.52 official comment at 250. The official comment advises that
the word "wholly" was added to avoid the argument, accepted in Merritt-Chapman & Scott
Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. 1974), that a defendant may be entitled to partial
mandatory indemnification if the defendant succeeds, by plea bargaining or otherwise, in
obtaining the dismissal of some, but not all, of the counts in an indictment. The Revised
Model Act states that a defendant is "wholly successful" only if the entire proceeding is
disposed of on a basis that involves a finding of nonliability. See Block, Barton & Radin,
Indemnification and Insurance of Corporate Officials, 13 SEc. REG. L.J. 239, 241-42 (1985).
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amended statute also does not appear to require partial indemnifi-
cation. 18 In contrast, Delaware and California explicitly require
partial indemnification "to the extent" of any partial success.1 9
Only a few cases examine what constitutes a partial success
under the Delaware and California statutes. In Galdi v. Berg20 par-
tial success did not include a dismissal without prejudice because
the same charge was pending in another forum. 21 The court in
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson 22 awarded partial in-
demnification to two defendants who, pursuant to a plea bargain,
were acquitted on one count of criminal conspiracy, but who were
unsuccessful on a related count. The Merritt-Chapman court held
that, in a criminal case, the statutory success standard includes
"any result other than conviction. ' 2
The second important difference in the representative
mandatory indemnification standards concerns defendants who
have in fact done something wrong, but who claim indemnification
because of success on procedural grounds not related to the merits
of the case. For example, a plaintiff may lack standing or the stat-
ute of limitations may have expired.24 California requires indemni-
fication only if the indemnitee prevails on the merits at trial.2 5 In
contrast, the phrase "on the merits or otherwise" in the Delaware
statute, the New York statute, and the Revised Model Act might
require indemnification for settlements if there is no payment or
18. N.Y. LAW § 723(a) (supra note 14). A phrase such as "to the extent of any partial
success" is conspicuously absent from the amended New York statute. The absence of this
or a similar phrase implies that partial indemnification is not required.
19. CAL. CODE § 317(d) (supra note 11); DEL. CODE § 145(c) (supra note 8).
20. 359 F. Supp. 698 (D. Del. 1973).
21. Id. at 701-02. The federal district court held that the directors and officers were
entitled to indemnification for expenses stemming from counts that had been dismissed
with prejudice. They were not entitled, however, to reimbursement for expenses resulting
from a count that had been dismissed without prejudice and without a finding of innocence
because that count was being litigated in another forum. Cf. American Nat. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Schigur, 83 Cal. App. 3d 790, 148 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1978) (denying indemnification
because the case was settled and dismissed with prejudice).
22. 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
23. Id. at 141 (stating that "[s]uccess is vindication ... [i]n a criminal action, any
result other than conviction must be considered success... [g]oing beyond the result ... is
neither authorized by subsection (c) nor consistent with the presumption of innocence").
24. See, e.g., Dornan v. Humphrey, 278 N.Y. App. Div. 1010, 1011, 106 N.Y.S.2d 142,
143-44 (1951) (finding that the defendant-directors were entitled to indemnification even if
the court dismissed the complaint only because the statute of limitations had expired).
25. See CAL. CODE § 317(d); Comment, Practical Aspects of Director's and Officer's
Liability Insurance-Allocating and Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend, 32
UCLA L. REv. 690, 698 (1985).
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assumption of liability by the indemnitee.2 6 No court has ad-
dressed a situation in which a director or officer, as an individual,
agrees to make a payment or to assume liability as part of a settle-
ment. The Revised Model Act states that "it is unreasonable to
require a defendant with a valid procedural defense to undergo [a
trial] to establish eligibility for mandatory indemnification. ' 28 Pre-
sumably, courts interpreting the Delaware and New York statutes
would adopt the Revised Model Act's reasoning and allow indem-
nification for successful defenses based on procedural grounds.2
The above discussion illustrates a method for determining the
parameters of the mandatory part of a particular state's indemnifi-
cation statute. First, determine whether the statute uses the
"wholly successful" standard. If this phrase is included, partial
mandatory indemnification for a partial success is not available.
Second, determine whether the statute's success standard includes
the phrase "on the merits or otherwise." If so, mandatory indemni-
fication for success on procedural grounds or for settlements is
available provided there is no payment or assumption of liability
by the indemnitee. Finally, mandatory indemnification is not avail-
able in states with entirely permissive statutes.30
III. PERMISSIVE INDEMNIFICATION
The following discussion of permissive indemnification ad-
dresses five specific issues. First, Section A will analyze the stan-
dards of conduct required for permissive indemnification under the
four representative statutes. Second, Section B will discuss the ex-
penses covered by each permissive indemnification statute and the
26. Two courts have held that settlements of this kind constitute "success on the mer-
its or otherwise." Wisener v. Air Express Int'l Corp., 583 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting
that "[t]he statute . . . refers to success 'on the merits or otherwise,' which surely is broad
enough to cover a termination of claims by agreement without any payment or assumption
of liability"); B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(applying Pennsylvania law and holding that the defendant was "successful on the merits or
otherwise" by negotiating a dismissal with prejudice of the claims against him without mak-
ing any payment).
27. Barton, Indemnification of Corporate Officials, in STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO
THE D&O INSURANCE CRIIsS 21, 28 (Law & Bus. 1986).
28. REvISED MBCA § 8.52 official comment at 250.
29. See Irenas & Moskowitz, Indemnifications of Corporate Officers, Agents, and Di-
rectors: Statutory Mandates and Policy Limitations, 7 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 117, 119 (1984)
(stating that "the phrase 'or otherwise' includes the disposition of proceedings other than by
a judicial determination on the merits").
30. Statutes without a mandatory indemnification part include: MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 156B, § 67 (West Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-7(o) (1972); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-19.1-91 (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1852(15) (1984).
[Vol. 40:737
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distinction between derivative suits and suits brought by third par-
ties.3' Third, Section C catalogues the procedures for permissive
indemnification and addresses the question of who decides whether
to indemnify a director or officer. Fourth, Section D discusses the
circumstances in which a court might order indemnification. Fi-
nally, Section E examines under what circumstances the corpora-
tion may advance litigation expenses.
A. Standards for Indemnification
Assuming indemnification is not mandatory, state corporation
laws often provide for permissive indemnification if the statutorily
required standard of conduct for directors and officers has been
met. Most statutes utilize similar standards for permissive indem-
nification in third party and derivative actions.2 These standards
of conduct define the boundaries for permissive indemnification;"3
however, a director or officer whose actions fall short of the re-
quired conduct still may apply for court-ordered indemnification.
34
Unlike mandatory indemnification, a director or officer whose con-
duct falls within the bounds of required conduct for permissive in-
demnification is not necessarily entitled to indemnification.
In third party actions in Delaware, a corporation may indem-
nify directors and officers if they have acted (1) in "good faith," (2)
"in a manner [they] reasonably believed to be in or not opposed
to 3 the best interests of the corporation," and (3) in the context of
a criminal proceeding, with "no reasonable cause to believe [their]
conduct was unlawful." 6 The good faith/reasonable belief stan-
31. A derivative action is brought by a shareholder to enforce a right properly belong-
ing to the corporation when, for whatever reason, the corporation itself fails to bring the
action. Any relief from a derivative suit inures to the benefit of the corporation. In contrast,
in a third party suit the plaintiff asserts its own cause of action and any relief is retained by
the third party, not passed on to the corporation.
32. See Barton, supra note 27, at 30-38.
33. Id. at 30.
34. Id.; see also infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing court-ordered
indemnification).
35. The phrase "in or not opposed to" indicates that a director or officer who is sued
solely because of insider status, such as under SEC rule 10b-5, may be indemnified if the
director or officer meets the other requirements of DEL. CODE § 145. Johnston, supra note
16, at 1997-98. Liability based on rule 10b-5 for trading on inside information requires that
the defendant possess the status of an insider. The Delaware statute's draftsmen included
the phrase "in or not opposed to" *.cauqe even though an insider may not have been acting
in the interests of the corporation, the insider was not acting necessarily in a manner op-
posed to the interests of the corporation. Id.
36. DEL. CODE § 145(a). State statutes with a standard for permissive indemnification
similar to Delaware's include: ALA. CODE § 10-2A-21(a) (1980); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.010(a)
19871 743
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dard of conduct that governs permissive indemnification in third
party suits also applies in derivative actions.37 In a derivative suit,
however, the corporation may not indemnify a director or officer
who has been adjudged liable to the corporation without court
approval.38
Formerly, an adjudication of negligence or misconduct pre-
cluded indemnification in derivative suits in Delaware." A recent
amendment to the Delaware statute, however, changed this stan-
dard to allow directors and officers to be eligible for permissive in-
(1985); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-005(a) (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309(a) (1980); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.014(1) (West 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 416-35(b) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-
1-5(a) (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.75(a) (Smith-Hurd 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
6305(a) (1981 & Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.83(a) (West Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 351.355(1) (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15)(a) (1983);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.751(1) (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:5(I) (1977 &
Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(1) (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 1031(A) (West 1986); OL REV. STAT. § 57.255(1) (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1410(a) (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1986).
37. DEL. CODE § 145(b). Section 145(b) provides that a corporation may indemnify a
director or officer in a derivative suit "if he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasona-
bly believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation and except that
no indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim, issue or matter as to which such
person shall have been adjudged to be liable to the corporation unless and only to the extent
that the court ... shall deem proper." Id.
38. Id. One commentator explains:
[T]he indemnification against third party claims (section 145(a)) is broader than in the
case of derivative actions. The policy reason behind the distinction is that, whereas in
the derivative action he has allegedly violated his duty to the corporate principal, the
director or officer who is sued by a third party was presumably working in good faith to
advance the corporation's interest when he injured the third party and, accordingly, by
analogy to the principles of agency law, he should be protected by the corporate
principal.
Johnston, supra note 16, at 1996.
39. Until 1986 DEL. CODE § 145(b) did not permit indemnification in derivative actions
for a director or officer "adjudged to be liable for negligence or misconduct in the perform-
ance of his duty to the corporation unless [authorized by the court]."
Statutes that still adhere to the Delaware standard before its amendment deleting the
"for negligence or misconduct" language include: ALA. CODE § 10-2A-21(b) (1980); ALASKA
STAT. § 10.05.010(b) (1985); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-005(b) (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-
309(b) (1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.014(2) (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-156(b) (1982);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 416-35(c) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-5(b) (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
para. 8.75(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305(b) (1981 & Supp. 1986); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.83(a) (West Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355(2) (Vernon 1966 &
Supp. 1986); NEB. RE. STAT. § 21-2004(15)(b) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 78.751(2)(Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:5(II) (1977 & Supp. 1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(3) (West 1969 & Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(2)
(Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1031(b) (West 1986); OR REV. STAT. § 57.255(2)
(1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1410(b) (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 47-2-58.2 (1983 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-4(o)(2) (1973); W. VA. CODE
§ 31-1-9(b) (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.05(2) (West Supp. 1986).
744
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demnification unless the director or officer has been adjudged lia-
ble to the corporation for gross negligence under the duty of care
or for a breach of the duty of loyalty.40 This amendment conforms
Delaware's standard for permissive indemnification to the holdings
in Smith v. Van Gorkom' 1 and Aronson v. Lewis.
42
Under the California statute, the New York statute, and the
Revised Model Act, the standards for permissive indemnification
in third party and derivative actions are similar to the Delaware
good faith/reasonable belief standard.3  California, however,
deletes the phrase "or not opposed to" the best interests of the
40. See supra note 37.
41. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see supra Recent Developments (Special Project) notes
48-86 and accompanying text.
42. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); see supra Recent Developments (Special Project) notes
36-47 and accompanying text.
43. See CAL CORP. CODE § 317(b)-(c). Section 317(b) provides:
A corporation shall have power to indemnify [any agent in a third party action] if such
person acted in good faith and in a manner such person reasonably believed to be in
the best interests of the corporation and, in the case of a criminal proceeding, had no
reasonable cause to believe the conduct of such person was unlawful.
Id. § 317(b). Section 317(c) provides:
A corporation shall have power to indemnify [any agent in a derivative suit] if such
person acted in good faith, in a manner such person believed to be in the best interests
of the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.
Id. § 317(c).
See N.Y. LAW § 722(a) & (c). Section 722(a) provides:
A corporation may indemnify [a director or officer in a third party action] if such direc-
tor or officer acted, in good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably believed to be in,
or, in the case of service for any other corporation or any partnership, joint venture,
trust, employee benefit plan or other enterprise, not opposed to the best interests of
the corporation and, in criminal actions or proceedings, in addition, had no reasonable
cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful.
Id. § 772(a). Section 722(c) provides:
A corporation may indemnify [a director or officer in a derivative suit] if such director
or officer acted, in good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably believed to be in, or,
in the case of service for any other corporation or any partnership, joint venture, trust,
employee benefit plan or other enterprise, not opposed to, the best interests of the
corporation.
Id. § 772(c).
See REVISED MBCA § 8.51(a). Section 8.51(a) provides:
[A] corporation may indemnify an individual made party to a proceeding because he is
or was a director against liability incurred in the proceeding if: (1) he conducted him-
self in good faith; and (2) he reasonably believed: (i) in the case of conduct in his
official capacity with the corporation, that his conduct was in its best interests; and (ii)
in all other cases, that his conduct was at least not opposed to its best interests; and (3)
in the case of any criminal proceeding, he had no reasonable cause to believe his con-
duct was unlawful.
Id. § 8.51(a).
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corporation. 44 The New York statute and the Revised Model Act
require that the indemnitee act in good faith and in the best inter-
ests of the corporation, but include the "not opposed to [the best
interests of the corporation]" standard for conduct undertaken for
an entity other than the corporation.45 In derivative suits the Cali-
fornia statute, the New York statute, and the Revised Model Act
all specifically proscribe indemnification for those adjudged liable
to the corporation if they have not met the required standard of
conduct.46 Until a recent amendment to the New York statute, a
judicial determination that a duty had been breached-not an ad-
judication of liability-precluded indemnification. 1
44. In contrast to Delaware, the more rigorous California standard intentionally de-
leted the "or not opposed to" phrase in order to require an indemnitee seeking indemnifica-
tion to have acted in what the indemnitee reasonably believed to be for the good of the
shareholders. For example, an officer probably could not claim indemnification for "litiga-
tion brought to recover short-swing profit or profits from trading in the stock of his corpora-
tion on the basis of inside information" because "[p]ersonal motives, and not the corporate
good, would appear predominant in such transactions." Heyler, Indemnification of Corpo-
rate Agents, 23 UCLA L. REV. 1255, 1258 & n.24 (1976).
Other statutes without the "not opposed to" language include: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 156B, § 67 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 719(1) (1981).
In addition to the good faith/reasonable belief standard, California also requires in de-
rivative suits "such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would use under similar circumstances." See supra note 43. Although the Cali-
fornia courts have not defined "reasonable inquiry," this requirement creates a higher stan-
dard of conduct than the Delaware standard.
45. See N.Y. LAW § 722(a)&(c) (supra note 43); REVISED MBCA § 8.51(a) (supra note
43).
Statutes with an "at least not opposed to" standard for all cases other than a director's
or officer's fiduciary duty to the corporation include: COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.5(2) (1986);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37(8) (Burns 1984 & Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.4A(b)
(West 1962 & Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.026(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981 &
Supp. 1986); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418(b) (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
302A.521(2) (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-414(2) (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-
4.1(b) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-91(2) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4.1(b) (1985);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-180(b) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-8-502 (Supp.
1986); Tax. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.02-1(b) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-697 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.025(3) (Supp. 1987).
46. See CAL. CODE § 317(c) (prohibiting indemnification if "adjudged to be liable to
the corporation in the performance of [one's] duty to the corporation"); N.Y. LAW § 722(c)
(prohibiting indemnification if "adjudged to be liable to the corporation"); REVISED MBCA
§ 8.51(d) (prohibiting indemnification if "adjudged liable to the corporation").
47. See FORMER N. Y. LAW § 722(a) (allowing indemnification "except in relation to
matters as to which such director is adjudged to have breached his duty to the corpora-
tion"). The amended New York statute allows indemnification in more cases because it is
possible to have a judicially determined breach of duty without an adjudication of liability.
The New York statute now is consistent with the other representative statutes discussed
herein concerning what precludes indemnification in a derivative action.
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B. Expenses Covered
The availability of permissive indemnification for various ex-
penses under the above standards depends on the type of litiga-
tion-third party or derivative. A Delaware corporation may in-
demnify its directors and officers for judgments, fines, amounts
paid in settlement, and reasonable expenses, including attorneys'
fees, incurred in actual or threatened third party actions.48 In de-
rivative suits Delaware allows indemnification for litigation ex-
penses (including attorneys' fees), but implicitly precludes indem-
nification for settlements or judgments.4 9 The Delaware legislature
rejected a proposal to permit indemnification for settlements or
judgments in derivative suits. This avoids the circularity that
would result if funds received by the corporation in the form of a
judgment simply were returned, through indemnification, to the
director or officer who paid the judgment." If a director or officer
is adjudged liable to the corporation in a derivative suit, the direc-
tor or officer may not be indemnified, even for expenses, unless
permitted by the court.5 1
In third party actions the California statute, the New York
statute, and the Revised Model Act each allow broad permissive
indemnification, including litigation expenses, judgments, fines,
and amounts paid in settlement.52 In derivative suits the California
48. DEL. CODE § 145(a) (providing indemnification "against expenses (including attor-
neys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably
incurred").
In addition to civil and criminal actions, Delaware allows indemnification in connection
with administrative and investigative proceedings. Under Delaware law the termination of a
third party action by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or plea of nolo contendere
does not preclude indemnification because none of these outcomes creates a presumption
that the good faith/reasonable belief standard of conduct has not been met. See id.
49. DEL. CODE § 145(b) (providing indemnification "against expenses (including attor-
neys' fees) actually and reasonably incurred"). Whereas § 145(a) authorizes indemnification
against "expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settle-
ment" in third party actions, § 145(b) authorizes indemnification merely against "expenses
(including attorneys' fees)" in derivative suits. The omission in § 145(b) of the phrase "judg-
ments, fines and amounts paid in settlement" was intentional. Block, Barton & Radin,
supra note 17, at 244 & n.20.
50. See Barton, supra note 27, at 36. Public policy supports a rule prohibiting indem-
nification for settlements and judgments in derivative suits; otherwise, shareholders would
not benefit and the result would be expensive. See Bus. LAW., Update (July/August, 1986).
51. See supra note 37.
52. In this respect, the California statute, the New York statute, and the Revised
Model Act are similar to the Delaware statute. See CAL. CODE § 317(b) (providing indemnifi-
cation "against expenses, judgments, fines, settlements and other amounts actually and rea-
sonably incurred"); N.Y. LAW § 722(a) (providing indemnification "against judgments, fines,
amounts paid in settlement and reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees actually and
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statute, the New York statute, and the Revised Model Act each
permit indemnification for litigation expenses except when the in-
demnitee is adjudged liable to the corporation. 3 Whereas Califor-
nia and New York explicitly deny indemnification for amounts
paid in settling or otherwise disposing of a derivative action, the
Revised Model Act, similar to Delaware, implicitly denies indemni-
fication for settlements.54 Only seven states do not specifically bar
indemnification for settlements in derivative suits.55
C. Procedures for Indemnification
The procedures for authorizing permissive indemnification are
essentially the same from state to state. Delaware, California, New
York, and the Revised Model Act all require case-by-case authori-
zation based on a determination that the potential indemnitee has
met the applicable standard of conduct.56 Many states also require
necessarily incurred"); REVISED MBCA § 8.50(4) (providing indemnification against "a judg-
ment, settlement, penalty, fine (including an excise tax assessed with respect to an employee
benefit plan), or reasonable expenses"). A conviction or plea of nolo contendere, without
more, does not prohibit permissive indemnification under any of these statutes. See CAL.
CODE § 317(b); N.Y. LAW § 722(b); REVISED MBCA § 8.51(c) official comment at 248.
53. See CAL. CODE § 317(c) (providing that "[a] corporation shall have power to in-
demnify [a director or officer in] any . . . action by or in the right of the corporation...
against expenses actually and reasonably incurred. . . [and that] [n]o indemnification shall
be made [to a director or officer] adjudged to be liable to the corporation"); N.Y. LAW
§ 722(c) (providing that "[a] corporation may indemnify [a director or officer in] an action
by or in the right of the corporation . . . against. . . reasonable expenses, including attor-
neys' fees, actually and necessarily incurred. . . except that no indemnification. . . shall be
made [to a director or officer] adjudged to be liable to the corporation"); REVISED MBCA
§ 8.51(e) (stating that "[i]ndemnification permitted under this section in connection with a
proceeding by or in the right of the corporation is limited to reasonable expenses incurred in
connection with the proceeding").
54. See CAL. CODE § 317(c); N.Y. LAW § 722(c); REVISED MBCA § 8.51(e).
55. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37(8) (Burns 1984 & Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13A-719(1)(1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 302A.521(2) (West 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355(2) (Vernon 1966 & Supp.
1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1852(15) (1984); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-105.1(a) (1977 & Supp.
1986).
56. DEL. CODE § 145(d) provides:
Any indemnification.. . (unless ordered by a court) shall be made by the corporation
only as authorized in the specific case upon a determination that indemnification ...
is proper in the circumstances because [a director or officer] has met the applicable
standard of conduct ... . Such determination shall be made (1) by the board of direc-
tors by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who were not parties to such
action, suit or proceeding, or (2) if such a quorum is not obtainable, or, even if obtaina-
ble, a quorum of disinterested directors so directs, by independent legal counsel in a
written opinion, or (3) by the stockholders.
CAL. CODE § 317(e) provides:
[A]ny indemnification under this section shall be made by the corporation only if au-
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notice to the shareholders of the indemnification.5 7 In Delaware
and New York the determination of whether the statutorily re-
quired standard of conduct has been met must be made either (1)
by the board of directors by a majority vote of a quorum of direc-
tors who were not parties to the proceeding, (2) by independent
legal counsel, or (3) by the stockholders."s In contrast, California
thorized in the specific case, upon a determination that indemnification of the [director
or officer] is proper in the circumstances because [that person] has met the applicable
standard of conduct... by (1) a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who
are not parties to such proceeding; [or] (2) approval of the shareholders ... with the
shares owned by the person to be indemnified not being entitled to vote thereon ....
N.Y. LAW § 723(b) provides:
[A]ny indemnification ... (unless ordered by the court) . . . shall be made by the
corporation, only if authorized in the specific case: (1) [b]y the board acting by a quo-
rum consisting of directors who are not parties to such action or proceeding upon a
finding that the director or officer has met the standard of conduct ... or (2) [i]f a
quorum ... is not obtainable or, even if obtainable, a quorum of disinterested direc-
tors so directs; (A) [b]y the board upon the opinion in writing of independent legal
counsel that indemnification is proper in the circumstances because the applicable
standard of conduct ... has been met ... or (B) [b]y the shareholders upon a finding
that the director or officer has met the applicable standard of conduct ....
REvIsED MBCA § 8.55(a)-(b) provides:
A corporation may not indemnify a director under section 8.51 unless authorized in the
specific case after a determination has been made that indemnification of the director
is permissible in the circumstances because he has met the standard of conduct set
forth in section 8.51. The determination shall be made: (1) by the board of directors by
majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors not at the time parties to the pro-
ceeding; (2) if a quorum cannot be obtained under subdivision (1), by majority vote of
a committee [designed for that purpose]; (3) by special legal counsel ... or (4) by the
shareholders, but shares owned by or voted under the control of directors who are at
the time parties to the proceeding may not be voted on the determination.
57. See, e.g., N.Y. LAW § 725(c). The New York statute provides:
If any expenses or other amounts are paid by way of indemnification, otherwise than
by court order or action by the shareholders, the corporation shall . . . mail to its
shareholders ... a statement specifying the persons paid, the amounts paid, and the
nature and status at the time of such payment of the litigation.
Id. Such a statement of notice gives shareholders an opportunity to challenge permissive
indemnification if they believe that the requisite standards have not been met. See McAd-
ams, A Proposal to Amend the Indemnification Section (§ 5) of the Model Business Cor-
poration Act, 31 Bus. LAW. 2123, 2138 (1976).
Statutes with notice requirements include: COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.5(10) (1986); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.014(9) (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-156(h) (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
32, para. 8.75(h) (Smith-Hurd 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.4A(11) (West Supp. 1986); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.026(11) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Supp. 1986); MD. CORPS. &
Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418(I) (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.521(8) (West 1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-414(11) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15)j) (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-11-4.1(k) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-91(10) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4.1(k)
(1985); Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1(s) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1986); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 23A.08.025(12) (1969 & Supp. 1986).
58. See DEL. CODE § 145(d) (supra note 56); N.Y. LAW § 723(b) (supra note 56). Pre-
sumably, in a shareholder vote a director or officer with an interest in the proceeding could
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authorizes permissive indemnification only if it is approved by a
quorum of disinterested directors or by the shareholders, with the
shares owned by the potential indemnitee not entitled to vote.59
California does not authorize indemnification based on a determi-
nation by independent counsel.6 0 The Revised Model Act combines
the above approaches and allows a determination by disinterested
directors, special counsel, or shareholders not party to the
proceeding."'
The use of independent legal counsel under the Delaware stat-
ute, the New York statute, and the Revised Model Act raises the
question of which counsel qualifies as "independent." Very few
states allowing this type of authorization for permissive indemnifi-
cation define "independent legal counsel. 6s2 Consequently, the saf-
est course is to seek the opinion of special counsel appointed solely
for this purpose. 3 In Schmidt v. Magnetic Head Corp. 4 a New
York state court defined "independent legal counsel" as "an attor-
ney who is free from past connections with the corporation or the
person to be indemnified. 6 5 According to the Revised Model Act,
a corporation should choose neither inside counsel nor regular
outside counsel to authorize permissive indemnification." If, how-
vote his shares in favor of indemnification.
59. See CAL. CODE § 317(e)(2) (supra note 56). Under most statutes, including Dela-
ware's and New York's, a shareholder decision is based on the votes of all shareholders. See
Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 17, at 246. The California approach, which is not fol-
lowed by any other state, prohibits participation in the shareholder vote by interested
shareholders. Thus, in California an indemnitee who owns a controlling block of stock could
not gain indemnification simply by voting personal shares.
60. CAL. CODE § 317(e) (supra note 56). The option of having independent legal coun-
sel decide whether the applicable standard of conduct has been met is not specifically men-
tioned in California's statute.
61. REvISED MBCA § 8.55(b) (supra note 56).
62. The only statutes defining the term "independent legal counsel" are OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 1701.13(e)(4) (Anderson 1985) (requiring the passage of five years from coun-
sel's previous association with either the corporation or the person seeking indemnification)
and WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.025(6) (1969 & Supp. 1986) (requiring the passage of
three years from any association between counsel and the corporation or the indemnitee).
63. See Johnston, supra note 16, at 1999.
64. 97 A.D.2d 151, 468 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1983).
65. Id. at 161, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 656. The court held that an attorney who owned no
company stock, had not previously represented the company, and had no past relationship
with the company's directors or officers constituted independent legal counsel despite the
fact that he had been retained by a partner in the law firm that represented the corporation
and the defendant-directors.
66. REVISED MBCA § 8.55 official comment at 256. A prior relationship might cause a
court to doubt the genuine independence of counsel for several reasons, including: (1) long-
standing ties with management; (2) possible involvement in the transactions being attacked;
and (3) dependence on management for future fees. See Johnston, supra note 16, at 1998.
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ever, a corporation selects independent legal counsel to authorize
permissive indemnification, counsel's required opinion may be in-
adequate or ill-suited for indemnification of expenses advanced
during the trial because counsel may not be able to analyze ade-
quately a director's or officer's conduct until after pre-trial discov-
ery has been completed.17 One commentator, therefore, recom-
mends that disinterested board members, whose actions would be
protected by the business judgment rule, authorize any permissive
indemnification.6 8
D. Court-Ordered Indemnification
A court may order indemnification not only in situations in
which a director or officer is entitled to mandatory indemnifica-
tion,69 but also in the permissive context. Delaware courts have the
authority to order indemnification notwithstanding a director's or
officer's ineligibility for permissive indemnification under the ap-
plicable standard.7 Despite an adjudication of liability, Delaware
allows indemnification, if the court deems it proper, for fair and
reasonable litigation expenses.7 1 The Revised Model Act also per-
mits court-ordered indemnification for fair and reasonable ex-
penses, even if the indemnitee has not met the requirements for
permissive indemnification. The Revised Model Act, however, lim-
its a court's authority to order indemnification in derivative suits. 72
67. See Johnston, supra note 16, at 1999. The extent of counsel's investigation cer-
tainly will affect the value of the opinion. An opinion on the propriety of an executive's
conduct issued before discovery proceedings undoubtedly will be filled with qualifications
that cast doubt on its overall value. An unqualified opinion issued after discovery probably
is too late to assist in the decision on advancements. Id.
68. Id. at 1999 & n.20 (stating that "[w]here practicable, the option of having the
indemnification approved by a neutral quorum of the board may be preferable, even if this
requires expanding the size of the board by the appointment of additional, neutral
directors").
"The alternative of seeking shareholder approval will usually be both unpalatable to the
defendants and cumbersome, particularly in publicly-held corporations." Id. at 1998.
69. See, e.g., Green v. Westcap Corp., 492 A.2d 260, 265-66 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985);
REVISED MBCA § 8.54(1) (stating that a court "may order indemnification if it determines
the director is entitled to mandatory indemnification").
70. See DEL. CODE § 145(b) (stating that "despite the adjudication of liability but in
view of all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to
indemnity for such expenses which the Court of Chancery or such other court shall deem
proper").
71. Id.
72. REVISED MODEL AcT § 8.54(2) provides that "[t]he director is fairly and reasonably
entitled to indemnification in view of all the relevant circumstances, whether or not he met
the standard of conduct set forth in section 8.51 or was adjudged liable as described in
section 8.51(d), but if he was adjudged so liable his indemnification is limited to reasonable
1987]
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In contrast, California and New York authorize court-ordered in-
demnification only if a director or officer has met the required
standard of conduct for permissive indemnification. 3
E. Advancement of Litigation Expenses
The various aspects of permissive indemnification discussed
thus far - the applicable standards, the expenses covered in third
party and derivative suits, the procedures for indemnification, and
court-ordered indemnification - all are part of the crucial issue of
whether to advance litigation expenses to directors and officers.
Even though a majority of indemnification statutes allow ad-
vances, 74 each of these statutes is entirely permissive; no state
grants directors and officers a right to funds in advance.
Recent amendments to the Delaware indemnification statute
do not make advancements mandatory, but permit them in more
cases. Delaware deleted language that required authorization of
advance litigation expenses to be "by the board of directors in the
specific case."'75 Before this amendment, directors were forced to
evaluate each request for an advancement on an individual basis.
This requirement rendered invalid charter or by-law provisions
and indemnification contracts that obligated the corporation to
make advances. 70 A provision that required the corporation to
expenses incurred." Id. The "idemnification with respect to derivative suits or improper
benefit is always limited to expenses by the last clause of section 8.54(2)." REVISED MBCA
§ 8.54 official comment at 253.
73. See CAL. CODE § 317(e)(3) (stating that "any indemnification under this section
shall be made by the corporation ...upon a determination [by the court] that . . . the
agent has met the applicable standard of conduct"); N.Y. LAW § 724(a) (noting that "indem-
nification shall be awarded by a court to the extent authorized under section 722 [which
requires the applicable standard of conduct for permissive indemnification be met]").
74. The only statutes that do not explicitly allow advancements are MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986); MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-7(o) (1972); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1852(15) (1984).
75. DEL. CODE § 145(e) provides:
Expenses incurred by an officer or director in defending a civil or criminal action, suit
or proceeding may be paid by the corporation, in advance of the final disposition of
such action, suit or proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such
director or officer to repay such amount if it shall ultimately be determined that he is
not entitled to be indemnified by the corporation as authorized in this section.
Before its amendment, § 145(e) read in pertinent part:
[I]n advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or proceeding as authorized by
the board of directors in the specific case upon receipt of an undertaking by or on
behalf of such director or officer to repay such amount unless it shall ultimately be
determined that he is entitled to be indemnified by the corporation as authorized in
this section.
76. See Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, memorandum of May 7, 1986, in THE COR-
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make advancements would have no effect if each specific request,
by statute, had to be approved by the board.7 The new Delaware
law appears to allow the general authorization of advancements,
through charter and by-law provisions and through individual con-
tracts for additional indemnity, without an ad hoc determination
that the applicable standard of conduct has been met.78
Another amendment to the Delaware statute changes a direc-
tor's or officer's obligatory promise to repay advancements 7e if in-
demnification ultimately is unavailable. Whereas a director's or of-
ficer's commitment to repay was formerly a binding obligation
"unless it shall ultimately be determined that he is entitled to be
indemnified," the amended Delaware statute makes a promise to
repay binding "if it shall ultimately be determined that he is not
entitled to be indemnified."' 0 Delaware's amendment shifts the
burden of going forward to obtain the required finding concerning
entitlement from the claimant to the corporation.8 1
Like Delaware, the three other representative statutes permit
advances if the corporation receives a promise from each director
or officer to repay funds not ultimately subject to indemnifica-
tion.2 California's statute is similar to the amended Delaware law
PORATE COUNSEL (July 8, 1986); see also infra notes 89-157 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing charter or by-law provisions and indemnification contracts providing additional
indemnity).
77. See Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, supra note 76.
78. Olson, Bogen & Magill, Responding to the D&O Insurance Crisis: Negotiated In-
demnification Contracts and Other Alternatives for Director and Officer Protection in
STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO D&O INSURANCE CRISIS 216, 224-25 (Law & Bus. 1986).
These authors argue that, under § 145(d), authorization by the board "in the specific case"
only governs the procedure for awarding indemnification; it does not affect extra-statutory
indemnity through charter or by-law provisions or indemnification contracts. For example,
advancements pursuant to a by-law provision would not require authorization by the board
in each case. Contra Block, Barton & Garfield, Advising Directors on the D&O Insurance
Crisis, 14 SEC. REG. L. J. 130, 141-42 (1986). These commentators argue that advancements
under a by-law provision would have to be pursuant to a prior determination that the stan-
dard of conduct for permissive indemnification has been met because Delaware's § 145(d)
requires authorization "in the specific case."
79. See DEL. CODE § 145(e) (supra note 75) (providing that "expenses . . .may be
paid by the corporation in advance. . . upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of
such director or officer to repay such amount").
80. Id.
81. "[B]y-laws may seek to shift the burden of proof as to entitlement to indemnifica-
tion by providing that the corporation must make indemnification on demand, unless,
within a specified time, the board of directors affirmatively determines that the agent has
not met the required standard." Olson, Bogen & Magill, supra note 78, at 224 (emphasis in
original).
82. See CAL. CODE § 317(f) (providing that "[e]xpenses incurred in defending any pro-
ceeding may be advanced by the corporation prior to the final disposition of such proceed-
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because authorization for funds advanced for litigation expenses
does not have to proceed on a case-by-case basis.8 3 In California,
however, the burden of obtaining a determination as to entitle-
ment still is on the director or officer.84 Likewise, New York does
not have a "specific case" requirement and the burden of establish-
ing entitlement is on the director or officer.85 In contrast, the Re-
vised Model Act still requires that authorization for advancements
be made "in the specific case" and in the same manner that a cor-
poration authorizes permissive indemnification.88 A number of
states have adopted the former Delaware statute, but, like the Re-
vised Model Act, have not deleted the language requiring authori-
zation on a case-by-case basis.87 A "specific case" requirement does
not necessarily mean fewer advancements; instead, it means that
advancements cannot be made obligatory by a corporation's char-
ter, by-laws, or indemnification contracts.
The foregoing analysis of the Delaware, California, and New
York statutes and the Revised Model Act provides some insights
into the scope of permissive statutory indemnification. In third
ing upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of the [director or officer] to repay such
amount unless it shall be determined ultimately that [he] is entitled to be indemnified as
authorized in this section"); N.Y. LAW § 723(c) (stating that "[e]xpenses incurrred in de-
fending a civil or criminal action or proceeding may be paid by the corporation in advance
of the final disposition of such action or proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking by or on
behalf of such director or officer [that such amounts] shall be repaid in case the person
receiving such advancement or allowance is ultimately found . . . not to be entitled to in-
demnification"); REVISED MBCA § 8.53(a) (noting that "[a] corporation may pay for or re-
imburse the reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a party to a proceeding in
advance of final disposition of the proceeding if the director furnishes the corporation a
written undertaking, executed personally or on his behalf, to repay the advance if it is ulti-
mately determined that he did not meet the standard of conduct").
83. CAL. CODE § 317(f) (supra note 82).
84. Id.; see also Barton, supra note 27, at 43-44.
85. N.Y. LAW § 723(c) (supra note 82).
86. REVISED MBCA § 8.53(c) (noting that "[d]eterminations and authorizations of
payments [for advances] shall be made in the manner specified in section 8.55"); see RE-
VISED MBCA § 8.55 (supra note 56).
87. Statutes with a "specific case" requirement include: ALA. CODE § 10-2A-21(e)
(1980); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.010(e) (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-005(e) (1977); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 64-309(e) (1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.014(5) (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 416-35(f) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-5(e) (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para.
8.75(e) (Smith-Hurd 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305(e) (1981 & Supp. 1986); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12.83(d) (West 1969 & Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 719(4)
(1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355(5) (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 78.751(5) (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. § 293-A:5(V) (1977 & Supp. 1986); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.13(e)(5) (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1031(e) (West 1986);
OR REV. STAT. § 57.260(4) (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1410(e) (Purdon 1967 & Supp.
1986); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9(e) (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.05(5) (West 1957 & Supp.
1986); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-105.1(d) (1977 & Supp. 1986).
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party actions, a corporation can indemnify its directors and officers
for all expenses, fees, settlements, and judgments if the applicable
statutory standard of conduct has been met. In contrast, indemni-
fication for settlements or judgments against directors and officers
in derivative suits is contrary to the public policy of most states
because the corporation would be indemnifying the defendants for
a judgment or settlement paid to the corporation by the defend-
ant-indemnitee. Depending on the circumstances, court-ordered
indemnification does not necessarily require that the statutory
standard of conduct for permissive indemnification be met. Ad-
vances for litigation expenses merely require a director's or officer's
unsecured, written promise to repay the funds if indemnification
ultimately is unavailable.8 In most states, however, the burden of
showing entitlement to ultimate indemnification is on the claim-
ant, not the corporation. In addition, advancements cannot be
made obligatory under a charter or by-law provision or indemnifi-
cation contract if the state statute requires a case-by-case determi-
nation. Thus, except for egregious breaches of the duty of care,
breaches of the duty of loyalty, and payment of settlements or
judgments in derivative suits, the corporation, if it elects to do so,
may reimburse directors and officers for liabilities under its power
to grant permissive indemnification.
IV. ADDITIONAL INDEMNITY
Because of the uncertainty of reimbursement for directors and
officers whose conduct falls within the boundaries of permissive in-
demnification, many corporations offer additional protection
through charter amendments, by-laws, and individual indemnifica-
tion contracts. In fact, some state statutes require that a corpora-
tion's authority to indemnify or to advance expenses be embodied
in a charter or by-law provision or in a resolution approved by a
majority of the stockholders.8 9 In contrast, other states have "ex-
88. See Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's Protection of its Directors and Officers
from Personal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 513, 545-46. Because promises to repay generally
are unsecured, any director or officer may obtain the resources necessary to defend a law-
suit. A security requirement would favor wealthy directors and officers who are able to post
security. See Johnston, supra note 16, at 1999.
Some statutes expressly provide that the promise need not be secured or conditioned on
one's financial ability to repay. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-418(f) (1985);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-4.1(f) (1983); N.D. CENr. CODE § 10-19.1-91(4) (1985); TEx. Bus.
CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.02-1(1) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 23A.08.025(7) (1969 & Supp. 1986).
89. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-15 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN.
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clusive" statutes that nullify any by-law or other corporate action
not "consistent" with the statute.90 The threshold question, there-
fore, is whether a particular state's indemnification statute has a
nonexclusivity clause that permits additional indemnity.
Delaware's nonexclusivity clause, section 145(f),91 is typical of
nonexclusivity clauses in other states.2 Amended section 145(f)
states that the specific indemnification rights and procedures,
which stem from the other subsections of section 145, are not ex-
clusive and do not bar any other rights to indemnification or the
advancement of expenses established through "by-law, agreement,
vote of stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise." 3 Not-
withstanding the breadth of Delaware's nonexclusivity clause,
courts usually read provisions of this type restrictively.9 4 The pur-
§ 496A.44 (West 1962 & Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (West 1970 &
Supp. 1986).
90. Exclusive indemnification statues include: COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.5(7)(a)
(1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320a(g) (1960 & Supp. 1986); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE
ANN. § 2-418(g) (1985); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.156-5 (West 1973 & Supp. 1986);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-414(7) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15)(f) (1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 53-11-4.1(G) (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-19(a) (1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4.1(g)
(1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-8-509 (1984 & Supp. 1986); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.02-1(M) (Vernon Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.025(8) (Supp. 1987).
91. DEL. CODE § 145(f) provides:
The indemnification and advancement of expenses provided by... this section shall
not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those seeking indemnification or
advancement of expenses may be entitled under any bylaw, agreement, vote of stock-
holders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to action in his official capacity
and as to action in another capacity while holding such office.
92. Nonexclusive statutes include: ALA. CODE § 10-2A-21(f) (1980); ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.05.010(f) (1985); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-005(F) (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309(F)
(1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.014(6) (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-156(f) (1982); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 416-35(g) (1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-5(f) (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para.
8.75(f) (Smith-Hurd 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305(f) (1981 & Supp. 1986); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 271A.026(12) (MichiefBobbs-MerrUll Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12.83(e) (West 1969 & Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 719(5) (1981); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 351.355(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.751(6) (Michie
1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A.5(VI) (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(8) (West
1969 & Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(e)(6) (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1031(F) (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.260(3) (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1410(f) (Purdon Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-58.6 (Supp. 1986); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-10-4(o)(6) (1973); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9(f) (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.05(6) (West Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-105.1(e) (Supp. 1986).
93. DEL. CODE § 145(f) (supra note 91).
94. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Growth Fund, Inc., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,437, at 94,719 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). In Continental Growth Fund a
charter provision authorized the indemnification of a director guilty of ordinary negligence
in managing the corporation's affairs. The court, however, denied indemnification because
the Maryland statute's nonexclusivity clause permitted additional rights to be granted
"under any by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders, or otherwise," but did not mention
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pose of Delaware's nonexclusivity clause, and others like it, is to
legitimize the power of management to guarantee reimbursement
to directors and officers through additional indemnification provi-
sions. 5 The effect of section 145(f), however, is to allow the courts,
based on "public policy" considerations, to set the outer bounda-
ries of indemnification. 8 A by-law or contract could be drafted
that would provide more extensive protection for directors and of-
ficers than normally allowed under the other clauses of the Dela-
ware statute, but public policy will limit the effectiveness of this
by-law or contract.9
Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc.,95 the leading case in-
terpreting Delaware's nonexclusivity clause, approved the indemni-
fication of a former director and officer based on a corporate by-
law providing for mandatory indemnification and a severance con-
tract.99 The court concluded that any additional indemnity must
satisfy public policy and have some independent legal basis.100 The
Mooney court distinguished permissive indemnification from addi-
tional indemnity under a nonexclusivity clause by defining addi-
tional indemnity as an independent, extra-statutory right of direc-
tors and officers. 101
charter provisions.
95. See Oesterle, supra note 88, at 538.
96. Id. at 538-39 (stating that the Delaware statute "establish[es] a minimum permis-
sible level of indemnification and allow[s] courts to expand that level if. . . so inclined 'and
that' [Delaware] draftsmen thus attempted to cut off budding restrictive judicial precedent
while saving whatever liberal treatments could be coaxed out of the courts"); see also Arsht
& Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes, 23 Bus.
LAW. 75, 80 (1967).
97. See Johnston, supra note 16, at 1996; Bishop, supra note 8, at § 6.03[1][a]. Al-
though the boundaries within which an indemnification by-law or contract must be drafted
are unclear, public policy in many states precludes indemnification for settlements by or
judgments against those adjudged liable to the corporation in derivative suits. See supra
note 50 and accompanying text.
98. 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953).
99. Id. at 891-92, 896. Mooney was decided under the old Delaware statute, which had
no explicit provision granting indemnification for a settlement, but which had a nonex-
clusivity clause similar to the current § 145(f). Mr. Mooney sued to compel indemnification
for attorney fees paid by him for the defense of a derivative suit. A contract between Mr.
Mooney and the corporation provided that the corporation would indemnify him in accor-
dance with a by-law whose terms were broader than the Delaware statute. In alternative
holdings, the court found that either the contract right was supported by independent con-
sideration or that the corporation's by-law was an independent basis for indemnification.
100. Id. at 896. The independent legal basis in the Mooney case was either the by-law
or the contract right. Id.
101. Id. (stating that "[w]here there exists, as there does here, an independent ground
for payment of litigation expenses, we see no reason to make an overriding reference to the
statute").
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An examination of the other representative statutes reveals
that the former New York law was an exclusive statute. 102 Recent
amendments to New York's indemnification statute, however, in-
clude a nonexclusivity clause similar to Delaware's section
145(f). 10 3 New York now expressly permits additional indemnity
through a corporation's charter, its by-laws, or individual con-
tracts.1 04 In contrast, the California statute and the Revised Model
Act contain exclusivity provisions that invalidate any agreement to
indemnify a director or officer not "consistent" with the statutes.10 5
Under these exclusivity statutes, directors' and officers' indemnifi-
cation rights cannot be enlarged by a charter or by-law provision,
or by an individual indemnification contract. 08
Whereas the California statute and the Revised Model Act re-
strict additional indemnity, a recent addition to the Delaware cor-
poration statute (section 102(b)(7)) encourages additional indem-
nity by permitting a corporation to include in its charter a
provision that would limit a director's monetary damages liability
for breaches of the duty of care.10 7 Such a provision, however, can-
102. See FORMER N.Y. LAW § 721 (providing that "[n]o provision made to indemnify
directors or officers . . . shall be valid unless consistent with this article").
103. See N.Y. LAW § 721. This law provides:
The indemnification and advancement of expenses granted pursuant to, or provided
by, this article shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which a director or
officer seeking indemnification or advancement of expenses may be entitled, whether
contained in the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws or, when authorized by such
certificate of incorporation or by-laws, (i) a resolution of shareholders, (ii) a resolution
of directors, or (iii) an agreement providing for such indemnification.
Id.
104. Id.
105. See CAL. CODE § 317(g) (providing that "[n]o provision made by a corporation to
indemnify its or its subsidiary's directors or officers for the defense of any proceeding,
whether contained in the articles, bylaws, a resolution of shareholders or directors, an agree-
ment or otherwise, shall be valid unless consistent with this section"); REVISED MBCA
§ 8.58(a) (stating that "[a] provision treating a corporation's indemnification of or advance
for expenses to directors that is contained in its articles of incorporation, bylaws, a resolu-
tion of its shareholders or board of directors, or in a contract or otherwise, is valid only if
and to the extent the provision is consistent with this subchapter").
106. The California statute and the Revised Model Act do not define "consistent" as
used in their statutes. Nevertheless, the term "consistent" is clearly a major limitation on
counsel's options for recommending additional indemnity.
107. DEL. CODE § 102(b)(7) provides:
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of incorpo-
ration by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation may also contain
any of the following matters:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the
liability of a director: (i) [flor any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the
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not limit a director's liability for (1) breaches of the duty of loy-
alty, (2) acts or omissions not in good faith, involving intentional
misconduct, or involving a knowing violation of law, (3) the pay-
ment of unlawful dividends, unlawful stock repurchases, or re-
demptions, or (4) transactions in which the director received an
improper personal benefit.108 Charter provisions that include this
amendment can absolve a director of liability for gross negligence
in observing the duty of care.109 Even though this amendment pro-
vides a director with relief from damages for a breach of the duty
of care, it does not abolish the duty itself because equitable reme-
dies such as an injunction or rescission still are available.110 Like-
wise, this amendment only limits directors' monetary liability for
their actions as directors, not for their actions as officers. 1 In ad-
dition, a charter provision adopted pursuant to this amendment
corporation or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, (iii) under [section]
174 of this title, or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an
improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability
of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provi-
sion becomes effective.
This amendment is the most significant change to the Delaware corporation law con-
cerning indemnification of directors and officers. See Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell,
supra note 76.
108. DEL. CODE § 102(b)(7) (supra note 107).
109. The official commentary to amended § 102(b)(7) explains as follows: "This provi-
sion enables a corporation in its original certificate of incorporation or an amendment
thereto validly approved by stockholders to eliminate or limit personal liability of members
of its board of directors or governing body for violations of a director's . . . duty of care."
Memorandum to ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, at 3, May 28, 1986 [hereinafter offi-
cial commentary].
110. See Veasey, Non-Insurance Alternatives: Charter Amendments in STRATEGIES
FOR RESPONDING TO THE D&O INSURANCE CIsIs 161, 168 (Law & Bus. 1986). Mr. Veasey, an
attorney with Richards, Layton & Finger in Wilmington, Delaware, argues that "[tihe duty
of care continues to have vitality in remedial contexts other than personal monetary dam-
ages against directors as individuals. For example, it will continue to be vitally important in
injunction and rescission cases and may well be relevant in elections, proxy contests, resig-
nations and removal contests."
111. See Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-
Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAw. 399, 403
(1987). As amended, § 102(b)(7) only applies to directors because of Delaware's concern for
effective corporate governance. Liability insurance has become a relatively standard condi-
tion of employment demanded by directors. "[T]he unavailability of traditional policies...
[has] threatened the quality and stability of the governance of Delaware corporations be-
cause directors have become unwilling, in many instances, to serve without the protection
which such insurance provides and, in other instances, may be deterred by the unavailabil-
ity of insurance from making entrepreneurial decisions." DEL. CODE § 102(b)(7) official com-
mentary (supra note 109) at 3.
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would apply only prospectively.112 Whereas newly formed Delaware
corporations may include an exculpatory provision in their charter,
existing corporations will be forced to seek shareholder approval
for a charter amendment.
113
Corporations have considerable flexibility in drafting charter
provisions that limit director liability. First, a corporation could
draft a charter provision under section 102(b)(7) that imposes a
cap or ceiling on liability for due care violations.1 4 This cap or
ceiling would establish a maximum dollar amount for which direc-
tors would be liable, either individually or collectively.115 Second, if
a corporation desires to eliminate director liability to the fullest
extent authorized, it could draft a provision that either incorpo-
rates section 102(b)(7) by reference 16 or tracks the statutory lan-
guage.1 17 Even without a provision comparable to Delaware's sec-
tion 102(b)(7), corporations in nonexclusive states might want to
adopt charter provisions that limit a director's liability for duty of
care violations because the provision might be within the outer
boundaries of their state's public policy or their state eventually
might follow Delaware's lead.
Another method of providing additional indemnity in a nonex-
clusive state is through a by-law provision. By-law provisions can
authorize various procedures and presumptions to make the in-
demnification process more favorable to directors and officers.11 8
112. See Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, supra note 111, at 402 (arguing that an excul-
patory charter provision passed pursuant to § 102(b)(7) will not cover acts or omissions that
occurred before the provision was enacted).
113. Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, supra note 76.
114. Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, supra note 111, at 402.
115. Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, supra note 76.
116. A provision incorporating the Delaware statute by reference would read as
follows:
To the fullest extent permitted by the Delaware General Corporation Law as the same
exists or may hereafter be amended, a director of this corporation shall not be liable to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty
as a director.
117. A provision tracking the current Delaware statute would read as follows:
A director of this corporation shall not be personally liable to the corporation or its
stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, except
for liability (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of Law, (iii) under Section 174 of the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law, or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an
improper personal benefit.
118. See Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, supra note 111, at 415. These authors assert
that by-law provisions for the protection of directors and officers might include: (i)
mandatory indemnification unless prohibited by statute; (ii) mandatory advancement of liti-
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For example, a by-law could provide the indemnitee with the right
to "appeal" an unfavorable determination by the board, indepen-
dent counsel, or shareholders. ' " A by-law also could provide that
the corporation must indemnify upon demand unless, within a
specified time, the board affirmatively determines that the director
or officer has not met the required standard of conduct, thus effec-
tively shifting the burden of proof for entitlement.'2 0 More impor-
tantly, a guarantee to advance litigation expenses could, and
should, appear in the corporation's by-laws.' 2' A by-law provision
that mandates indemnification in circumstances in which the state
statute is permissive is a highly advantageous right for directors
and officers.'2
When drafting an indemnification by-law, commentators gen-
erally recommend the following language: "The corporation shall
indemnify... to the full extent permitted by applicable law."' 2
gation expenses, which the indemnitee can obtain on demand; (iii) accelerated procedures
for determining whether the appropriate standard of conduct has been met; (iv) procedures
under which a favorable determination will be deemed to have been made if the board fails
or refuses to act; and (v) reasonable funding mechanisms. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Olson, Bogen & Magill, supra note 78, at 224.
121. See Oesterle, supra note 88, at 565 (arguing that "[b]ecause the standards for
providing advances are very lenient and it is often of critical importance for officials to
secure a source of funds before an indemnifiable liability is actually incurred, the guarantee
of advances has much value"); Olson & Morgan, D&O Exclusions Extend to Takeover Con-
text, Legal Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at 23, 34. Olson and Morgan assert that:
Of critical importance is a provision stating that officers and directors have an absolute
right to receive an advance of litigation expenses and costs from the corporation in
return for an undertaking to repay any amounts advanced if it is subsequently deter-
mined that the officer or director is not entitled to indemnification. Without such a
provision, [in the hostile takeover context] the decision to advance litigation-related
costs may be left to the discretion of the board of directors of the corporation who are
in office at the time the request for the advance is made.
Id.
122. J. BIsHOP, supra note 8, at § 7.01, 7-2.
123. See Olson, The D&O Insurance Gap: Strategies for Coping, Legal Times, Mar. 3,
1986, at 25, 32; Johnston, supra note 16, at 2011; J. BISHOP, supra note 8, at § 7.03[2], 7-20.
Professor Bishop, asserts that the best by-law for the average corporation seeking the fullest
indemnification coverage possible under a nonexclusive statute would read as follows:
The corporation shall indemnify every person who was or is a party or is or was
threatened to be made a party to any action, suit, or proceeding, whether civil, crimi-
nal, administrative or investigative, by reason of the fact that he is or was a director,
officer, employee, agent, or controlling stockholder of the corporation, or is or was serv-
ing at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee, agent, or trustee of
another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, employee benefit plan, or other
enterprise, against expenses (including counsel fees), judgments, fines and amounts
paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with such
action, suit or proceeding, to the full extent permitted by applicable law. Such indem-
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One court has indicated that this language would require a corpo-
ration to indemnify directors and officers in all situations in which
indemnification does not violate the law."" Although a general pro-
vision of this type maximizes protection for corporate officials, it is
inadequate to clarify the rights of a director or officer who contests
a corporation's refusal to indemnify. 25 A by-law, therefore, should
combine specific procedures for indemnification, like those men-
tioned above, with broad language obligating the corporation to in-
demnify to the fullest extent possible.
The following are suggestions for drafting a by-law or charter
provision that may expand an indemnitee's rights: (1) expressly
provide coverage for investigations (including internal corporate
investigations - for example, a special litigation committee's in-
quiry into derivative claims), administrative proceedings, appeals,
and other matters not covered by statute; 21 (2) specifically address
claims against directors and officers representing the corporation
as ERISA fiduciaries; 2 7 (3) if not covered by statute, specifically
discuss fines, excise taxes and other penalties, and attorney's
fees; 128 (4) include a provision stating that the indemnification
rights established in the charter or by-law are to be deemed a con-
tract between the individual and the corporation and that any sub-
sequent repeal or modification does not diminish the individual's
nification may, in the discretion of the board of directors, include advances of his ex-
penses in advance of final disposition of such action, suit or proceeding, subject to the
provision of any applicable statute.
J. BISHOP, supra note 8, at § 7.03[2], 7-20.
124. B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 787, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (finding
that the use of the "mandatory word 'shall'" in the corporation's by-laws gave the directors
and officers a contractual right to indemnification).
125. See Oesterle, supra note 88, at 565. Professor Oesterle points out the provision's
shortcomings as follows:
For example, an official settles a third-party action but the board decides that he did
not act in good faith. Can the official seek a de novo review of the good faith decision in
court? Or does the board decision receive deference under a facsimile of the business
judgment rule? Can the officer argue that he has a right to a separate determination of
his good faith by independent legal counsel or the stockholders? Whose decision con-
trols if there is a conflict on the matter? Thus, the drafters of the general contract
provision see and accomodate only one side of the indemnification problem: the provi-
sion legitimizes and maximizes corporate desires to protect its controlling officials, but
it is woefully inadequate in clarifying the rights of an official who contests a corpora-
tion's refusal to indemnify.
Id. (footnote omitted).
126. See Olson, supra note 123, at 32.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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rights; 29 (5) include a provision stating that a determination by
the board that indemnification is not available - e.g., pursuant to
Delaware Code section 145(d) - will not be binding on a court
when deciding whether indemnification is mandatory or permis-
sive;130 (6) extend coverage to heirs, personal representatives, and
the estates of the directors and officers;131 and (7) provide for in-
demnification and advancement of expenses in suits brought by a
director or officer.13 2 Exhibit 1 in the Appendix contains an exam-
ple of a possible by-law or charter provision that incorporates the
above ideas. 3
Depending on the situation, a corporation may choose to re-
strict statutorily authorized indemnification through a by-law pro-
vision. One reason for imposing a restriction would be to improve
relations with shareholders.1 34 In addition, because the applicable
law may permit indemnification for a director or officer who is su-
ing fellow board members, the corporation might decide to limit
indemnification provisions to claims against directors and officers;
otherwise, the corporation might be forced to fund a dissident's
lawsuit against other directors.3 5
Another means of providing additional indemnification in a
nonexclusive state is by the execution of a contract between the
corporation and its directors. A contract for indemnification has
the same advantages as a by-law that sets forth the specific process
and procedures for indemnification.3 6 Unlike a by-law, however,
129. Id. Absent this provision, a director or officer would have to rely on equitable
doctrines, such as estoppel, to avoid being disadvantaged by a change in control. Id. A con-
tract right would negate any requirement that the indemnitee prove reliance on the previous
by-law or charter provision. See Sparks, Johnston & Conan, Indemnification and Directors
and Officers Liability Insurance: The Legal Framework Under Delaware Law, in THE CRI-
sIS IN DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 3, 11 (Law & Bus. 1986).
130. See Olson & Morgan, supra note 121, at 34.
131. See Olson, supra note 123, at 32.
132. See Sparks, Johnston & Conan, supra note 129, at 11; see, e.g., Hibbert v.
Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983). In Hibbert former directors
sought indemnification for proxy contest expenses and legal fees incurred in suits filed by
the former directors in their unsuccessful bid for reelection.
133. The proposed charter or by-law provision in the Appendix is reprinted from THE
CORPORATE COUNSEL (July/August, 1986). Excepting § 1, it is virtually identical to the model
proposal set forth in Sparks, Johnston & Conan, supra note 129, at 27-28.
The proposed provision does not distinguish between third party and derivative claims
because it is possible that a state's public policy does not bar indemnification in derivative
suits.
134. J. BISHOP, supra note 8, at § 7.01, 7-3.
135. Barton, supra note 27, at 52.
136. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. A contract for indemnification
must be supported by independent consideration of some benefit to the corporation. Mere
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an indemnification contract cannot be repealed or amended by a
new board of directors. 137 The greatest advantage of an indemnifi-
cation contract is the security and certainty it offers. This security
will induce qualified individuals to serve on boards and will help
persuade sitting members not to resign."8 Although in Mooney v.
Willys-Overland Motors, Inc. 39 the court held that an indemnifi-
cation contract was enforceable, 140 the outer limits of contractual
indemnification have not been established firmly.
In drafting an indemnification contract, counsel may adopt
one of the two basic approaches currently in use. The first ap-
proach virtually duplicates the proposed by-law or charter provi-
sion found in Exhibit 1. These contracts evince individual, bar-
gained-for consideration and are not subject to unilateral
amendment or rescission by the corporation.' The second ap-
proach is intended to supplement or replace cancelled or reduced
directors' and officers' liability insurance. 2 This type of indemni-
fication contract is written in essentially the same terms as a D&O
insurance policy, but without all the exclusions and without a dol-
lar limit on liability. 4 3 These quasi-insurance contracts,'" how-
ever, are not insurance. Therefore, they are subject to public policy
limitations on indemnification" 5 and their value is limited to the
assets of the corporation. 146 Exhibit 2 in the Appendix is an exam-
ple of an indemnification contract modeled after the second
approach.
147
In addition to charter or by-law provisions or indemnification
contracts, several commentators recommend that corporations es-
approval by the board of directors is not sufficient. See Sparks, Johnston & Conan, supra
note 129, at 20.
137. See Royner, D&O Indemnity, Legal Times, Nov. 25, 1985, at 1, 2; Olson & Mor-
gan, supra note 121, at 34.
138. See Royner, supra note 137, at 2.
139. 204 F.2d 888 (3rd Cir. 1953).
140. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
141. See Olson, supra note 123, at 33.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see infra Insurance (Special Project) notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
144. Olson, Bogen & Magill, Non-insurance Alternatives for Director and Officer Pro-
tection, in THE CRISIS INDIRECTORS' & OFFIcERS' LIABILTY INSURANCE 313, 321 (Law & Bus.
1986).
145. Id; see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
146. See Olson, Bogen & Magill, supra note 144, at 321-22 (noting that directors and
officers relying on indemnification contracts are subject to the same collection and insol-
vency risks as other creditors).
147. The proposed contract is reprinted from Olson, Bogen & Magill, supra note 144,
at 344-50.
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tablish one of two outside funding mechanisms to segregate funds
and release these funds automatically when certain procedures
have been followed. 148 These funding mechanisms represent practi-
cal ways to obtain prompt indemnification if the corporation ref-
uses to pay because of bankruptcy or a change in control.149 First,
the corporation could set up an irrevocable trust to release assets
upon a determination by an independent trustee that the claimant
is entitled to indemnification. 150 In Security America Corp. v.
Walsh, Case, Coale, Brown & Burke' 51 the court upheld an irrevo-
cable trust that was established in the face of an imminent change
of management and that provided for the continued advancement
of expenses to the outgoing directors. 52 Second, the corporation
could obtain an irrevocable letter of credit from a bank or third
party in favor of its directors and officers. 53 This letter of credit
would be payable directly to directors and officers entitled to in-
demnification under the corporation's by-laws if a request to the
corporation did not result in prompt indemnification.
5 4
Contracts and by-laws relating to indemnification might be
adopted by the board of directors independently or as part of a
"package" for shareholder approval. In the case of a Delaware cor-
poration, this package might include a new charter provision au-
148. See Barton, supra note 27, at 53; Olson & Morgan, supra note 121, at 34.
149. See Olson & Morgan, supra note 121, at 34.
150. See Barton, supra note 27, at 53; Olson, supra note 123, at 25.
151. No. 82-C-2953 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1985) (applying Delaware law).
152. Id. at 9. The court found that an irrevocable trust authorized by the outgoing
board pursuant to DEL. CODE § 145(e) was a legitimate technique for funding advances. The
thrust of the decision was that a court would not question the mechanism employed by the
corporation to ensure that an indemnitee received the proper funds if there was an underly-
ing right to indemnification.
153. See Barton, supra note 27, at 53.
154. See Zirinsky & Mrazek, Effects of Insolvency on Indemnification and Insurance
of Directors and Officers in STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO THE D&O INSURANCE CRISIS 121,
136-37 (Law & Bus. 1986). The authors note that:
While there is little precedent in the area, there appears to be a substantial basis for
enforcing an arrangement whereby a third-party would make the required indemnifica-
tion payments to directors or officers subject to a reimbursement obligation by the
corporation, secured by corporate assets, which would ultimately be satisfied in accor-
dance with a Chapter 11 plan. . . . [The purpose of this type of letter of credit would
be to cover] the deductible amounts and self-retention portion not covered by the D&O
insurance and, where D&O insurance is not available, any litigation expenses or other
expenses that might be incurred in defending an action during the period in which the
corporation could not fund such payments. . . . In all cases, the scope of this assured
funding arrangement would be no broader than the corporation's indemnification obli-
gations under its by-laws.
Id.
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thorized by section 102(b)(7). 55 If these agreements were adopted
by a vote of disinterested directors or were deemed to be fair, they
most likely would be given effect even in the absence of share-
holder approval.156 If practical, however, shareholder approval is
highly desirable to avoid possible challenges for self-dealing.
157
Thus, in nonexclusive jurisdictions, additional indemnity
through charter or by-law provisions or individual contracts can
augment the protection afforded directors and officers. As with
permissive indemnification, the boundaries of additional indemnity
are circumscribed by public policy. In Delaware, a charter provi-
sion effectively can eliminate damages for a director's breach of the
duty of care. Other provisions in either the charter or by-laws can
clarify gray areas concerning advanced expenses, actions covered,
and procedural issues. Indemnification contracts are yet another
option to clarify obligations and to establish enforceable contract
rights between a director or officer and a corporation.
ROBERT P. McKINNEY
155. See supra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
156. Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, supra note 111, at 416-17. Delaware law does not
appear to require shareholder approval of indemnification contracts.
157. See Olson, supra note 123, at 32. Shareholder approval might have the effect of
shifting the burden of proving "fairness" away from the interested directors and onto the
party objecting to the indemnification agreement. See Olson, Bogen & Magill, supra note
78, at 228.
[Vol. 40:737
DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
Appendix
Exhibit 1
PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
Section 1. Elimination of Certain Liability of Directors. A di-
rector of the Corporation shall not be personally liable to the Cor-
poration or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, except for liability (i) for any breach
of the director's duty of loyalty to the Corporation or its stockhold-
ers, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, (iii) under
Section 174 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, or (iv) for
any transaction from which the director derived an improper per-
sonal benefit.
Section 2. Indemnification and Insurance.
(a) Right to Indemnification. Each person who was or is made
a party or is threatened to be made a party to or is involved in any
action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or
investigative (hereinafter a "proceeding"), by reason of the fact
that he or she, or a person of whom he or she is the legal represen-
tative, is or was a director or officer, of the Corporation or is or was
serving at the request of the Corporation as a director, officer, em-
ployee or agent of another corporation or of a partnership, joint
venture, trust or other enterprise, including service with respect to
employee benefit plans, whether the basis of such proceeding is al-
leged action in an official capacity as a director, officer, employee
or agent or in any other capacity while serving as a director, officer,
employee or agent, shall be indemnified and held harmless by the
Corporation to the fullest extent authorized by the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law, as the same exists or may hereafter be
amended (but, in the case of any such amendment, only to the ex-
tent that such amendment permits the Corporation to provide
broader indemnification rights than said law permitted the Corpo-
ration to provide prior to such amendment), against all expense,
liability and loss (including attorneys' fees, judgments, fines,
ERISA excise taxes or penalties and amounts paid or to be paid in
settlement) reasonably incurred or suffered by such person in con-
nection therewith and such indemnification shall continue as to a
person who has ceased to be a director, officer, employee or agent
and shall inure to the benefit of his or her heirs, executors and
administrators; provided, however, that, except as provided in par-
agraph (b) hereof, the Corporation shall indemnify any such per-
1987]
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son seeking indemnification in connection with a proceeding (or
part thereof) initiated by such person only if such proceeding (or
part thereof) was authorized by the board of directors of the Cor-
poration. The right to indemnification conferred in this Section
shall be a contract right and shall include the right to be paid by
the Corporation the expenses incurred in defending any such pro-
ceeding in advance of its final disposition; provided, however, that,
if the Delaware General Corporation Law requires, the payment of
such expenses incurred by a director or officer in his or her capac-
ity as a director or officer (and not in any other capacity in which
service was or is rendered by such person while a director or of-
ficer, including, without limitation, service to an employee benefit
plan) in advance of the final disposition of a proceeding, shall be
made only upon delivery to the Corporation of an undertaking, by
or on behalf of such director or officer, to repay all amounts so
advanced if it shall ultimately be determined that such director or
officer is not entitled to be indemnified under this Section or oth-
erwise. The Corporation may, by action of its Board of Directors,
provide indemnification to employees and agents of the Corpora-
tion with the same scope and effect as the foregoing indemnifica-
tion of directors and officers.
(b) Right of Claimant to Bring Suit. If a claim under para-
graph (a) of this Section is not paid in full by the Corporation
within thirty days after a written claim has been received by the
Corporation, the claimant may at any time thereafter bring suit
against the Corporation to recover the unpaid amount of the claim
and, if successful in whole or in part, the claimant shall be entitled
to be paid also the expense of prosecuting such claim. It shall be a
defense to any such action (other than an action brought to en-
force a claim for expenses incurred in defending any proceeding in
advance of its final disposition where the required undertaking, if
any is required, has been tendered to the Corporation) that the
claimant has not met the standards of conduct which make it per-
missible under the Delaware General Corporation Law for the Cor-
poration to indemnify the claimant for the amount claimed, but
the burden of proving such defense shall be on the Corporation.
Neither the failure of the Corporation (including its Board of Di-
rectors, independent legal counsel, or its stockholders) to have
made a determination prior to the commencement of such action
that indemnification of the claimant is proper in the circumstances
because he or she has met the applicable standard of conduct set
forth in the Delaware General Corporation Law, nor an actual de-
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termination by the Corporation (including its Board of Directors,
independent legal counsel, or its stockholders) that the claimant
has not met such applicable standard or conduct, shall be a de-
fense to the action or create a presumption that the claimant has
not met the applicable standard of conduct.
(c) Non-Exclusivity of Rights. The right to indemnification
and the payment of expenses incurred in defending a proceeding in
advance of its final disposition conferred in this Section shall not
be exclusive of any other right which any person may have or here-
after acquire under any statute, provision of the Certificate of In-
corporation, by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders or disinter-
ested directors or otherwise.
(d) Insurance. The Corporation may maintain insurance, at its
expense, to protect itself and any director, officer, employee or
agent of the Corporation, or another corporation, partnership, joint
venture, trust or other enterprise against any such expense, liabil-
ity or loss, whether or not the Corporation would have the power
to indemnify such person against such expense, liability or loss
under the Delaware General Corporation Law.
Exhibit 2
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
This Agreement is made as of the day of
,1986, by and among Corpora-
tion, a Delaware corporation (the "Corporation"), and the under-
signed ("Agent") [of , a Delaware corporation
(the "Company"),] with reference to the following facts:
The Agent is currently serving as a (Director) (Officer) [of the
Company at the request] of the Corporation and the Corporation
wishes the Agent to continue in such capacity. The Agent is will-
ing, under certain circumstances, to continue in such capacity.
In addition to the indemnification to which the Agent is enti-
tled pursuant to the by-laws of [the Company and] the Corpora-
tion, and as additional consideration for the Agent's service, the
Corporation has, in the past, furnished at its expense directors and
officers liability insurance protecting the Agent in connection with
such service. Effective , 1985, such in-
surance was cancelled or severely limited with respect to coverage
of . The Corporation has not been able to
replace such insurance at a reasonable cost.
The Agent has indicated that he does not regard the indemni-
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ties available under [the Company's and] the Corporation's by-
laws and the insurance remaining in effect as adequate to protect
him against the risks associated with his service to [the Company]
the Corporation. The Agent may not be willing to continue in of-
fice in the absence of obtaining insurance such as that he has here-
tofore enjoyed.
In order to induce the Agent to continue to serve as (Director)
(Officer) for [the Company] the Corporation and in consideration
for his continued service, the Corporation hereby agrees to indem-
nify the Agent as follows:
1. The Corporation will pay on behalf of the Agent, and his
executors, administrators or assigns, any amount which he is or be-
comes legally obligated to pay because of any claim or claims made
against him because of any act or omission or neglect or breach of
duty, including any actual or alleged error or misstatement or mis-
leading statement, which he commits or suffers while acting in his
capacity as a Director and/or Officer of [the Company] the Corpo-
ration and solely because of his being a Director and/or Officer.
The payments which the Corporation will be obligated to make
hereunder shall include, inter alia, damages, judgments, settle-
ments and costs, cost of investigation (excluding salaries of officers
or employees of [the Company or] the Corporation) and costs of
defense of legal actions, claims or proceedings and appeals there-
from, and costs of attachment or similar bonds; provided, however,
that the Corporation shall not be obligated to pay fines or other
obligations or fees imposed by law or otherwise which it is prohib-
ited by applicable law from paying as indemnity or for any other
reason.
2. If a claim under this Agreement is not paid by the Corpora-
tion, or on its behalf, within ninety days after a written claim has
been received by the Corporation, the claimant may at any time
thereafter bring suit against the Corporation to recover the unpaid
amount of the claim and if successful in whole or in part, the
claimant shall be entitled to be paid also the expense of prosecut-
ing such claim.
3. In the event of payment under this Agreement, the Corpo-
ration shall be subrogated to the extent of such payment to all of
the rights of recovery of the Agent, who shall execute all papers
required and shall do everything that may be necessary to secure
such rights, including the execution of such documents necessary
to enable the Corporation effectively to bring suit to enforce such
rights.
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4. The Corporation shall not be liable under this Agreement to
make any payment in connection with any claim made against the
Agent:
(a) for which payment is actually made to the Agent under a
valid and collectible insurance policy, except in respect of any ex-
cess beyond the amount of payment under such insurance;
(b) for which the Agent is entitled to indemnity and/or pay-
ment by reason of having given notice of any circumstance which
might give rise to a claim under any policy of insurance, the terms
of which have expired prior to the effective date of this Agreement;
(c) for which the Agent is indemnified by [the Company or]
the Corporation otherwise than pursuant to this Agreement;
(d) based upon or attributable to the Agent gaining in fact any
personal profit or advantage to which he was not legally entitled;
(e) for an accounting of profits made from the purchase or sale
by the Agent of securities of [the Company or] the Corporation
within the meaning of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and amendments thereto or similar provisions of any
state statutory law or common law; or
(f) brought about or contributed to by the dishonesty of the
Agent seeking payment hereunder; however, notwithstanding the
foregoing, the Agent shall be protected under this Agreement as to
any claims upon which suit may be brought against him by reason
of any alleged dishonesty on his part, unless a judgment or other
final adjudication thereof adverse to the Agent shall establish that
he committed (i) acts of active and deliberate dishonesty (ii) with
actual dishonest purpose and intent, which acts were material to
the cause of action so adjudicated.
5. The maximum aggregate amount of indemnity payable by
the Corporation hereunder to the Agent is $
6. No costs, charges or expenses for which indemnity shall be
sought hereunder shall be incurred without the Corporation's con-
sent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
7. The Agent, as a condition precedent to his right to be in-
demnified under this Agreement, shall give to the Corporation no-
tice in writing as soon as practicable of any claim made against
him for which indemnity will or could be sought under this Agree-
ment. Notice to the Corporation shall be directed to
. attention: Corporate Secretary (or such
other address as to the Corporation shall designate in writing to
the Agent); notice shall be deemed received if sent by prepaid mall
properly addressed, the date of such notice being the date post-
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marked. In addition, the Agent shall give the Corporation such in-
formation and cooperation as it may reasonably require and as
shall be within the Agent's power.
8. Costs and expenses (including attorneys' fees) incurred by
the Agent in defending or investigating any action, suit, proceeding
or investigation shall be paid by the Corporation in advance of the
final disposition of such matter, upon receipt of a written under-
taking by or on behalf of the Agent to repay any such amounts
unless it is ultimately determined that the Agent is entitled to in-
demnification under the terms of this Agreement. Notwithstanding
the foregoing or any other provision of this Agreement, no advance
shall be made by the Corporation if a determination is reasonably
and promptly made by the Board of Directors by a majority vote
of a quorum of disinterested directors, or (if such a quorum is not
obtainable or, even if obtainable, a quorum of disinterested direc-
tors so directs) by independent legal counsel, that, based upon the
facts known to the Board or counsel at the time such determina-
tion is made, (a) the Agent acted in bad faith or in a manner that
he or she did not believe to be in or not opposed to the best inter-
est of [the Company and/or] the Corporation, or (b) with respect
to any criminal proceeding, the Agent believed or had reasonable
cause to believe his conduct was unlawful, or (c) the Agent deliber-
ately breached his duty to [the Company and/or] the Corporation
or its [their] stockholders.
9. In order to provide for just and equitable contribution in
circumstances in which the indemnification provided for herein is
held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unavailable to the
Agent in whole or part, the parties agree that, in such event, the
Corporation shall contribute to the payment of the Agent's losses
in an amount that is just and equitable in the circumstances, tak-
ing into account, among other things, contributions by other direc-
tors and officers of the [Company or] Corporation pursuant to In-
demnification Agreements or otherwise. The Corporation and the
Agent agree that, in the absence of personal enrichment, acts of
intentional fraud or dishonesty or criminal conduct on the part of
the Agent, it would not be just and equitable for the Agent to con-
tribute to the payment of Losses arising out of any action, suit,
proceeding or investigation in an amount greater than: (i) in a case
where the Agent is a director of [the Company or] the Corporation
or any subsidiaries of [the Company or] the Corporation, but not
an officer of [the Company or] the Corporation or any such subsid-
iary, the amount of fees paid to the Agent for serving as a director
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during the 12 months preceding the commencement of such action,
suit, proceeding or investigation; or (ii) in a case where the Agent
is a director of [the Company or] the Corporation or any subsidiar-
ies of [the Company or] the Corporation and is an officer of [the
Company or] the Corporation or any such subsidiary, the amount
set forth in clause (i) plus 5% of the aggregate cash compensation
paid to the Agent for service in such office(s) during the 12 months
preceding the commencement of such action, suit, proceeding or
investigation; or (iii) in a case where the Agent is only an officer of
[the Company or] the Corporation or any subsidiaries of [the Com-
pany or] the Corporation, 5% of the aggregate cash compensation
paid to the Agent for service in such office(s) during the 12 months
preceding the commencement of such action, suit, proceeding or
investigation. The Corporation shall contribute to the payment of
losses covered hereby to the extent not payable by the Agent pur-
suant to the contribution provisions set forth in the preceding
sentence.
10. This Agreement may be executed in any number of coun-
terparts, all of which taken together shall constitute one document.
11. Nothing herein shall be deemed to diminish or otherwise
-restrict the Agent's right to indemnification under any provision of
the certificate of incorporation or by-laws of [the Company or] the
Corporation or under Delaware law.
12. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in ac-
cordance with Delaware law.
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